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I would like to begin by thanking Lau Kin Chi for inviting me to this forum and to the
many of you who worked hard to make this forum happen. I feel honored to be here and am so
very impressed with the way you have organized this forum to create dialogue and the sharing of
ideas. I look forward to continued conversations with all of you in the future.
I begin my paper with some reflections on the structuration of the world from the
positioning in which I find myself and then move to imaginative resources that I find important
for imagining a future that is sustainable and based on social justice.
We are living through a massively unstable re-structuring of the post-Cold War world.
Despite the early pronouncements in the West that the Cold War is over, much of the world is
still living through the after-effects of its supposed end, and will do so for some time to come.
The tearing apart of Syria, the re-arrangement of alliances in relation to the Israeli occupation of
Palestine and indeed a wide range of unstable movements to re-arrange the entire Middle East
and West Asia, in both more democratic and more authoritarian directions, from Morocco to
Turkey to Iraq and Afghanistan, are precisely the manifestation of these after-effects. These
after-effects manifest in different ways in various regions in addition to the Middle East, such as
Latin America, Asia and southern Africa. The “post-socialist” countries are thus not “post” in the
sense of having buried socialism deep in the past; rather they are “post” in the sense that postcolonial theory has argued: a moment of grappling with the interstices of creating an Other
world, and, in the current era, negotiating the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism that keeps
producing as a counter-effect various revisionist histories of the socialist past, as scholars such as
Dai Jinhua and Neda Atanasoski have argued and that Wang Hui argued in his paper on
Thursday.
This is a struggle to make governments around the world more accountable to its citizens
– or maybe we should say not to forego its former accountability in the wake of worldwide
transformations through neoliberal capitalism. In the capitalist West, the political end of
socialism – as distinct from its ongoing source as an imaginary of a future based on social justice
– the political demise of socialism withdrew pressure on capitalist countries to provide for their
citizens. It enabled the vicious backlash by elites across the U.S. and Western Europe, which we
are still struggling with. This struggle is what makes current movements so heightened, violent
and ongoing.
I have always been an anti-imperialist, with a focus of course on the U.S. imperialist
ventures that have caused so many damaged lives around the world. Positioned as I am from
within the U.S., but fully aware of U.S. imperialist ventures that have, all my life, intimately
linked my world to the worlds of all those whose lives have been upended by U.S. military
interventions, what feels overwhelming at the moment is the rise of authoritarian populism. Just
a short time ago, we thought we saw on the horizon a worldwide movement of progressive
governments taking the place of various authoritarian holdovers from the days of military
dictatorships. But we had failed to appreciate the depth of their necessary intimacies with
multinational capitalism. This authoritarian populism is based in a popular common sense that
liberal democracy has failed. It has failed to meet ordinary people’s needs. It has failed to
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address the yearnings of ordinary people for a stable, livable life. Those people, whom we used
to call the working class, have risen to support authoritarian leaders. They are quite correct in
this aspect of their diagnosis that liberal democracy has not met their needs. Yet they have
channeled their discontent and anger through nationalism and, in the case of the U.S. and
Western Europe, through racist and anti-immigrant sentiments. Here, Arlie Hochschild’s recent
book [get title] is illuminating in her description of poor whites in the southern United States,
who feel, in their own metaphor, that others have jumped in the line before them to get, in their
view, welfare that they don’t deserve. Thus, unlike in the 1930s, when fear of popular support
for socialism led capitalist democracies to institute a wide range of social welfare programs,
today, elites fear nothing of the kind.
I want to thank Muto San for emphasizing the need to decolonize the mind. In all my
years of teaching and engaging in activist work, I have tried to make this my main goal: to
decolonize the mind of those in the U.S. who do not see the U.S. empire for what it is. I have
always been struck by the fact that most Americans do not connect their lives directly with the
effects of U.S. empire. In fact, they rarely think about the U.S. empire at all. This with the
exception of course of all those peoples who have fled military dictatorships that the U.S.
supported and fled to the U.S. to escape, especially from Latin America. But others go about
their daily lives without acknowledging the nature of the empire that makes their lives liveable.
[IF TIME, GET KALI’S PIECE ON MONDOWEISS] Otherwise, how could people possibly
accept the ridiculous idea that Saddam Hussein was allied with Al Qaeda. In the United States,
there is a concerted effort not to educate, or to actively block education that would make the U.S.
empire visible to American citizens. I want to thank Mireille for mentioning Palestine. Palestine
is a good example of this suppression of knowledge. I have been actively working for
Palestinian rights for a number of years now. In the U.S., Israel is the only country in the world
for which Congress and state governments are willing to go against the Constitution. In the last
5 years, there have been one after another laws introduced that try to suppress speech critical of
Israel, by falsely equating that criticism with anti-Semitism – this despite the fact that the loudest
critics of Israel in the U.S. are Jewish and the loudest supporters of Israel are not just right-wing
Zionists but people – like Trump – who are actually anti-Semitic. I myself have been brought up
on charges 3 times for holding events for which I was accused of fostering anti-Semitism, this
despite the fact that all the participants in these events were Jewish, including a group of Israeli
soldiers against the occupation. Yet, I must also point out that there has been a significant shift
among people of color in the U.S. in their positioning in relation to Palestine/Israel. The Black
Lives Matter movement explicitly discusses the slogan from Ferguson to Palestine. Native
American activists have made close ties with the struggle for Palestinian rights in addressing the
ongoing resistances to settler colonialism. And Palestinians have been working to educate these
different activists about how to deal with tear gas, and other more contemporary forms of
violence used against them. The Asian American Studies Association was the first to pass a
boycott resolution against Israel. The Chicano Studies Association followed suit, as did the
National Women’s Studies Association.
The situation of Palestine is an index of how the world has moved towards authoritarian
populism, not only including within the 1967 borders of Israel, where it has amplified the settler
colonial power of Israel, but also some of the countries in the Middle East that are now willing to
ally with Israel. Authoritarian populism has challenged the seemingly stable set of international
arrangements during the Cold War that lulled many into thinking another world war was not
possible. Now we can glimpse that possibility again.
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We have neoliberal capitalism to thank for this situation and we also have nationalism
intersecting with racism to thank. But while neoliberal capitalism unites elites in some respects,
authoritarian populism clothed in nationalism, also means elites in different countries must
choose which kind of authoritarian leader they will support, which in turn might upend their
previous global aspirations. The history of Nazi Germany resonates very much today. Take
Trump. The terrible irony is that progressives in the West have long opposed the various free
trade agreements, such as instituted by the World Trade Organization (WTO), that Trump is now
seeming to shake up and perhaps tear down. They opposed them on the grounds of their
injustice toward working-class subalterns. Yet, progressives – at least those located in the U.S. - never clearly distanced themselves from the nationalism that was part of the political
unconscious of their positioning. They have not fully committed to a post-nationalist world.
Now we have authoritarian populist leaders railing about the need to close the borders not only
against what they view as unfair trade arrangements but also against all the others whose lives,
upended by the effects of U.S. empire and its efforts to continue to maintain hegemony in the
post-Cold War world. Thus, the set of unstable contradictions in this current moment.[ Thus the
ability of authoritarian leaders…]
In the United States, there is of course an obsession with the so-called rise of China.
Here, I think we might find Laura Doyle’s work on inter-imperiality usefl. We must examine
both elite and non-elite actors in what Doyle calls their “inter-imperial positionality” to examine
how they shape economic, material and cultural practices in this new post-post-Cold War (to use
Dai Jinhua’s phrase). In the case of the so-called rise of China, we might hesitate, however,
before invoking the term “imperial.” It is perhaps too soon to make that pronouncement.
In the U.S., as I said, we hear anxious talk about the so-called rise of China. Indeed,
China has changed dramatically in the last thirty years, as it has embraced in an experimental
fashion the global capitalist economy and fiercely promoted a culture of consumption within
China. This pursuit of wealth is motivated through the long durée history of colonialism in
China since the mid-19th century. Up and through the present, Chinese public discourse and
history textbooks include continuous discussions of that history, in part because that history
motivated the socialist revolution and the rise of the Communist Party to power. In addition, we
also find a strong nationalism that has been decoupled from socialism, and re-coupled with
global capital.
That China’s pursuit of wealth has led to its increased presence in various regions of the
Global South is clear. The Chinese state is mainly interested in gaining access to greater energy
resources in order to develop its own domestic economy, which now increasingly relies on
intensive consumption of energy resources. In this pursuit, the Chinese state has called upon a
variety of different approaches for different regions. Thus, it has not tried to impose one
homogeneous means for interacting with quite distinct governments and peoples. And again, it
has been experimental and supple in its various strategies. Indeed, one characteristic of the
Chinese state throughout the socialist era and after has been its experimental nature.
For example, with many African nations, China has invoked their mutual socialist past of
shared politics and China’s ongoing support. During that socialist past, China was intimately
tied to various socialist countries and movements in Eastern Europe, Africa and southeast Asia.
China had offered financial and food aid as it tried to fashion a third world alternative to both the
Soviet Union and the United States. China pulls on this past history to describe its current
activities. What do we make of this current narrative of south-south cooperation? (See the debate
between Yan Hairong and C.K. Lee.) China offers a great deal of infrastructure building in
3

various regions. They describe this as support for other nations’ ability to pursue their own
development. They also point out how much this differs from the interventions of the U.S.,
which, they assert, never offered concrete aid. The types of infrastructure being built – roads,
dams, ports – also support China’s extraction needs. But the Chinese state is also willing to build
that which a particular government requests, with no direct relation to China’s extraction needs.
The Chinese state also takes a strong public stance of non-interference in the governance of other
states. This is partly due to its opposition to criticisms of human rights violations within China,
and partly due to its interest in investing in countries no matter the form of their governments.
But again, it poses itself in direct opposition to the U.S. model of imperial interference.
Doyle’s work and that of others working in world history and international relations
rightly emphasize the interactions between the imperial powers and their representatives, on the
one side, and local populations, on the other. In the case of China, focusing on ordinary Chinese
migrants is essential. Indeed, Chinese immigrants to various African, Latin American, and
Southeast Asian countries have lived in those regions for several centuries, long pre-dating this
recent so-called rise. Thus, it is important to focus not simply on the Chinese state, or to
homogenize all Chinese actors. Derek Sheridan (2017), for example, has examined the fraught
relationship between Chinese state actors and ordinary Chinese migrants in Tanzania or, as he
puts it, the differentiation between actions taken in the name of the state – and not just the
Chinese state -- and actions by those who feel more vulnerable. Sheridan, in the spirit of Doyle,
gets us past binaries of homogeneous groups: the Tanzanians versus the Chinese. In examining
the complex dialectics and multiple differentiations among Tanzanian state officials, Tanzanian
street bureaucrats, Chinese state company employees and Chinese migrant small shop owners,
Sheridan addresses the central question of “contested vernacular theories about the relationship
between imperialism, power, and status; and in turn, contested expectations regarding the
Chinese state in the world.” (2017) How, he asks, “does one determine privilege or vulnerability
when one party has the economic capacity to pay while the other has the sovereign capacity to
detain?” Moreover, there is an ongoing set of disagreements among various Chinese in Tanzania
about the following question: are the vulnerabilities of global Chinese citizenship caused by an
unwilling state [a state unwilling to back them up] or are they the result of the insufficient ethics
of private Chinese citizens?” This question in turn raises the large issue of the relationship
between privilege and power, on the one hand, and risks and vulnerabilities on the other. How
are these distributed and how do the relations among them operate?
Mingwei Huang’s work (2017) examines cross-ethnic, cross racial relations and the
matter of racism. Huang emphasizes the various racialized intimacies that shape the racial
hierarchies between Chinese traders and African workers in Johannesburg, South Africa, the
racializing practices that are central to capital accumulation by Chinese entrepreneurs in
Johannesburg, South Africa. As she argues, “the ever-expanding frontiers of global capital forces
movement and transgression, and in the process unmoors norms of race, gender, class, and
sexuality.” Huang creatively tracks the broader arenas of intimacy, such as hands changing
money, sharing toilets and rubbing up against one another in narrow aisles. In other words,
intimacy in the realms of public life. This is terrifically insightful, because these kinds of
intimacies are not so easy to police, and defy easy categorization but at the same time are
absolutely central to the feelings of anxiety that Chinese traders feel that keeping racial
hierarchies intact are never secured. Ironically, it is the very idea of pollution that draws some
Chinese migrant traders to South Africa. They think South Africa’s air is clean. Are we
witnessing disruption here or rather a more ambiguous set of practices that both re-enforce and
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transgress all at once? The use of different terms like overseas, migration, diaspora point to
different relationships to China and to the country of residence.
Of course, other people important in this process are the non-elite ordinary citizens of the
countries in which China’s presence is becoming increasingly evident. In Latin America, for
example, what has struck me most about China’s interventions there is that, unlike in Africa, the
Chinese state-owned companies do not bring the majority of employees from China but rather
hire local labor. Perhaps they have learned from some of the intensive labor conflicts in places
like Zambia (CK Lee).
This has affected the interactions between local people and those Chinese working for
state-owned companies. At least that is the case in Argentina. In my own work on China in Latin
America, which I am just beginning, I have found, in Argentina at least, a wide range of views
on China’s presence. Again, most Argentinians do not have any contact either with Chinese
companies or Chinese people. Chinese migrants are now the majority of small grocery store
owners; if an Argentinian has an opinion about Chinese, they will most often point to the grocery
stores. Among scholars and journalists, one finds more detailed attention paid to China’s
presence. Among this latter group, I have found a very self-conscious inter-imperial
positioning, not to mention in some cases anti-imperial positioning. But also important to note is
the wide range of views about China’s presence in Argentina. Some, like Luciano Bolinaga, talk
of a “Beijing Consensus” having replaced the Washington Consensus. They believe China is
building an economic hegemony in Latin America that is “re-primitivizing” the Latin American
economy. That is, China is forcing Latin America into a position of under-development, as a
source of natural resources for which in return China presses its own manufactured products.
Moreover, China fails to pass along the manufacturing technologies, knowledge and resources to
take the next step in turning raw natural resources into products, such as soybean products.
Ninety-five percent of Argentina’s soy is sold to China. Indeed, the rise in soy production in
Argentina is in direct response to Chinese demand (Rachel Cypher).
Others do not cast blame on China but instead blame their own government for its
never-ending corruption, failure to initiate any development projects on its own, crushing debt
burdens, and therefore failure to care for its people. These latter welcome Chinese investments.
What would one call this position? There are still others who welcome Chinese presence in
order to counter the U.S. This would be the case in Venezuela. Others feel it is vital for
Argentinians to educate themselves about China and Chinese culture in anticipation of a future,
more personally felt relationship with China. Two Argentine journalists have dedicated
themselves to starting a new journal, whose title is the Chinese name Dangdai (当代)(meaning:
the Contemporary Era): Primera Revista de Intercambio Cultural entre Argentina y China.
In returning to the “inside” of China, it is worth noting the ideological work that Chinese
state-owned film companies are performing to support China’s increased presence in the global
south. The Wolf Warrior set of films is a case in point. They are the highest grossing films in
recent years. In a cultural commentary series on Wolf Warrior II, a group of international
scholars analyze the film’s representations of China’s presence in Africa (in Chinese at：
http://routerjcs.nctu.edu.tw/router; coming soon in English at u.osu.edu/mclc/). The Chinese hero saves
the “good” Africans from African terrorists who are backed by an American mercenary. This
film is for a domestic Chinese audience. Its complex mix of goodwill and nationalism lays the
groundwork for broad support of the Chinese state’s ventures abroad. But its inevitable
contradictions have also lent themselves to broad criticism from within China.
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This is a moment of flux and transition within the global economy. China, certainly more
than the U.S. offers the opportunity to address this situation with a commitment to social justice.
This moment of flux and transition has many cracks and gaps through which other
possibilities emerge. Given that this panel is about the commons, I want to emphasize the
importance of finding sources for other imaginaries of a world fundamentally based on social
justice. These sources for an imaginary not based in the current viciousness of insecure capitalist
pursuit of profits are already in existence. At the broadest level of social justice, we must
address the incipient destruction of the earth and its livability, not only for humans but for all
living creatures.
Maristella Swampa, an Argentine scholar, offers one piece of this imaginary. Swampa
argues that rather than talk about a passage from a Washington consensus to a Beijing consensus,
instead we should talk about what she calls the commodities consensus. If the Washington
consensus was based on financial valorization, then the commodities consensus is based on
large-scale exportation of raw materials. In dialogue with other Latin American scholars
addressing these concerns, Swampa describes the commodities consensus as a process of ‘reprimarization’ of Latin American economies, orienting those economies toward what she and
other scholars call “neo-extractivist developmentalism.” Swampa and others define neoextractivist developmentalism as “…the pattern of accumulation based on the overexploitation of
generally nonrenewable natural resources, as well as the expansion of capital’s frontiers toward
territories previously considered nonproductive.” Neoextractivist developmentalism is
characterized by large-scale enterprises, a focus on exportation, and a tendency for
monoproduction or monoculture. Its emblematic figures include strip mining, the expansion of
the petroleum and energy frontier, the construction of large hydroelectric dams, the expansion of
the fishing and forestry frontier, and the generalization of the agribusiness model. They are
capital intensive, rather than labor-intensive, activities. The commodities consensus is built on
the idea that there is an irrevocable or irresistible character of the current extractivist dynamic,
resulting from growing global demand for raw materials.
Unlike the Washington consensus, which defined the state as a meta-regulating agent, the
commodities consensus establishes greater flexibility for the state’s role. Swampa argues that
progressive governments are caught up in the commodities consensus, as it enables them to fund
social programs for the most vulnerable from extractivist rents, thus operating in tight association
with multinational capital. Thus, in the Latin American setting we see the coupling not only of
neo-extractivist developmentalism and neoliberalism, but also of neo-extractivist
developmentalism and progressivism. This coupling of neo-extractivist developmentalism and
progressive governments has led to a decrease in democracy, as they pursue what Swampa calls
“a belligerently developmentalist discourse, accompanied by a practice of criminalizing
resistance.” Thus we find inevitably the movement of progressive governments toward more
traditional models of domination, linked to the classic nation-state model. These progressive
governments opt for using a nationalist language, negating the legitimacy of claims and
attributing them either to “infantile ecologism” as in Ecuador, or to the actions of foreign NGOs
as in Brazil.
Despite this criminalization of resistance, one consequence of the current extractivist turn
has been the explosion of social-environmental conflicts, with 120 mining conflicts affecting 150
communities in 2010, rising to 198 conflicts involving 297 communites by 2014. Most striking,
in Swampa’s view, is the articulation between different social actors, including indigenouscampesino movements, social-environmental movements, environmental NGOs, networks of
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intellectuals and experts, and cultural collectives. “These struggles recognize new languages for
valuing territory and natural resources… and the valorization of local knowledges, often with
campesino-indigenous roots.”
To challenge and overturn this neo-developmentalist extractivism, promoted by
transnational corporations, hegemonic actors of the extractivist model, and progressive
governments that believe extractivism is quickest path to progress and development, Swampa
emphasizes the cultural battle in material and symbolic realms in relation to new ways of
thinking about the good life in relation to environmental justice. Swampa argues that “a large
part of the Latin American Left and progressive populism has maintained a productivist vision of
development, which tends to privilege the conflict between capital and labor, minimizing or
giving little attention to new social struggles concentrated on territory and the commons.… In
this political-ideological framework dominated by the productivist vision, the current dynamic of
dispossession becomes a nonconceptualizable blind spot. Social-environmental problematics are
considered secondary or expendable in the light of the severe problems of poverty and exclusion
in Latin American societies.” Instead, we should abandon the ideology of progress and the
confidence in the infinite expansion of productive forces. This is based on what she calls,
borrowing from Dumont and Mattin, models of bad development (maldesarrollo in Spanish).
The concept of bad development “illuminates both the failure of development
programs as an ideal, a promise… and the different dimensions of “bad living.” “Bad living”
encompasses not only the increased poverty of marginalized communities but also the
hegemonic ideology of a mode of life based on infinite consumption but which leads to the
destruction of the very bases of potentially viable modes of living.
In place of this ideology of bad development and bad living, Swampa proposes three
concepts. The first is what is called in Spanish buen vivir, or good living, an indigenous concept
across Latin America. Buen vivir emphasizes a new relationship between human beings and
nature, by de-commodifying nature. By “nature,” the concept encompasses not only human
relationships to the land but also to other, non-human living beings, challenging anthropocentric
logic. Buen vivir also emphasizes the abandonment of the idea of development as unlimited
growth, the promotion of ways of valuing activities beyond financial profit, and a recognition of
the rights of nature, meaning the defense of life systems and the intrinsic value of nature itself
independent from human valorization. Buen vivir leads to ecological justice, “whose objective
would be not to charge fines for damages but rather to engage in environmental recomposition
independent of its economic cost.” Thus “sustainable development” and the “green economy”
are insufficient for addressing environmental justice.
The second concept is “communal ethos.” By communal ethos, Swampa, inspired by
Ecuadorian Bolívar Echeverrría, means “fields of collective experimentation that reclaim the
production and reproduction of the common, beyond the state and the market.” Common goods
are not understood as commodities; their value is not measured in prices. Emphasis is rather on
“the use value of things, their practical consistency, as opposed to capitalism’s structuring
principle, which emanates from exchange value and becomes autonomous as capital-value.”
They are also to be distinguished from “public goods,” which Swampa argues “are the dominion
of the state and therefore are subject to states exercising their jurisdiction without obligation to
consult communities.”
Finally, Swampa emphasizes an eco-feminist notion of the “ethics of care.” This notion
highlights the parallels between the exploitation of women and the exploitation of nature – minus
previous essentialisms -- through invisibilized and nonrecognized reproductive labor.
7

This ethos of of care further emphasizes a socially and ecologically sustainable society, through
values such as reciprocity, cooperation, and complementarity.
Although Swampa is quite critical of what she views as the contradictions in the actions
of the states of Bolivia and Ecuador, I think we should still retain two important innovations that
we can admire: one is the recognition in their constitutions that nature has rights. As Swampa
herself states, this is a new concept horizon. We should pause here because the implications of
recognizing that nature has rights has multiple possibilities. Certainly, a regime of rights is not
where we would want to end, but where we want to begin. Here at least, in this moment, we can
begin to demand accountability for the destruction of non-human life on this planet. We could
begin a process of reparations to the earth.
The other innovation is Ecuador’s recognition that it is a “plurinational state.” Passed in
2008, Ecuador’s constitution resignifies the country as a “plurinational state,” one that affirms
the sovereignty of the Indigenous and Afro-descended groups within it. The Ecuadoran
constitution also has another innovation: the definition of family as diverse. These changes were
due to many, many years of work on the part of Indigenous communities that later allied with
queer activists. Christine Keating and Amy Lind argue that these re-definitions have a certain
logic of multiplicity and open-endedness and lead the way to recognition of non-normative
families. While Keating and Lind acknowledge that the actual implementation of these aspects
of the constitution have been “limited, compromised and forestalled, they nonetheless conclude
that these changes are important “institutional resistance to the coloniality of power in Ecuador.”
I turn to another source for creating at the level of the imaginary a set of concepts to help
us imagine the commons: Stefano Harney and Fred Moten, in their book The UnderCommons:
Fugitive Planning and Black Study take inspiration from life in Black communities. Rather than
speak of the commons, they emphasize the undercommons. Their argument is that vernacular
social life already contains alternative economies of giving, taking, being with and for. As they
state, the undercommons is “….a space and time which is always here.” We can seek to create
new modes of collective life but we should also not leave behind those ways of life that already
have been in alternative modes for a long time, since these communities have been so
marginalized that some of these modes were not visible and thus not eradicated. The
undercommons is “…the incessant and irreversible intellectuality of these activities [playing in a
band, old men sitting on a porch, chatting] [that] is already present.” The undercommons is in
everyday life, especially the lives of the marginalized. The undercommons is a place that
continuously produces its own un-regulatedness, or lack of regulation; it is ongoing and exists in
the present. As Harney and Moten say, inspired by Fanon “You are always already in the thing
that you call for and that calls you.” We are always “on the way to the place we are already
making.” Harney and Moten talk about the curriculum of the Mississippi Freedom School during
the 1960s in the southern U.S. This curriculum posed two questions to the people they were
working with: What do we not have that we need? But also, what do we have that we want to
keep? This latter question presumed that African Americans in the South had something they
wanted to keep, no matter how oppressed they were. And that they wanted to organize
themselves around the principle that they did not want everything that their oppressors had.
The undercommons is peopled by those whom colonialism and capitalism have rendered
as nonentities. Thus the undercommons helps us to work towards “…the end of the standpoint
from which colonialism makes sense…. To bring colonialism to an end, one does not speak truth
to power, one has to inhabit the crazy, nonsensical, ranting language of the other…who has been
rendered a nonentity by colonialism.”
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Again, inspired by Fanon they argue that “…blackness…is the willingness to be in the space
that has been abandoned by colonialism, by rule.”
The undercommons is that place where people have the right to refuse that which has
been refused to them. It is the refusal of the choices offered. “And in this refusal, we can reshape
desire, reimagine possibility and do so separate from the fantasies nestled into rights and
respectability.” In the undercommons, people refuse what Harney and Moten term “the call to
order.” And it is also the refusal to call others to order – that is, the refusal to be the police who
hail the subject into interpellation and the re-instantiation of the law.
The undercommons is not satisfied with recognition from a system that denies “a) that
anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to be the broken part; so we refuse to ask for
recognition and instead we want to take apart …the structure that, right now, limits our ability to
find each other.” The goal is not to end the troubles but to end the world that created those
particular troubles as the ones that must be opposed. In their essay on the university, The
undercommons of the university is where study gets done outside of the structuring of the
university.
The undercommons is the place where we prepare for the future we cannot yet imagine
through what they call “study”: a mode of thinking with others that trains us to be “with and for”
and not just in antagonism against. This is study as opposed to knowledge production.
The undercommons is the place of what they call fugitivity, which is not just escape or exit a la
Paolo Virno but means literally not settling, not being fixed into position, always being in
Deleuzian motion. In an indirect critique of the civil rights movement in the U.S., Harney and
Moten argue that the undercommons refuses the false image of enclosure, “the unreal idea that
we must correct ourselves in order to protect an illusory right to what we do not have”: “in the
moment of right/s the commons is already gone.”
People in the undercommons are not invisible to capital but there “always elaborations of
social life that are not comprehended or exploited by capital. Capital, in its agency, just doesn’t
get it, necessarily.”
Finally, life in the undercommons involves improvisation of the relationship between
necessity and freedom. This gets us to the issue of debt and affective communities. Global
capital, under the Washington Consensus, developed in a way that protects investors from any
risk in their investments, especially when they invest in other nation-state’s economies. The
humanitarian disasters we have witnessed in Greece, brought on by the European Union but
largely by Germany and the outrageous and preventable disaster in Puerto Rico testify to the
need for a global, progressive re-imaginining of the issue of debt. David Graeber has suggested a
“jubilee” that would forgive the debt. But I think we need to do more and put forth an agenda in
which “debt” is something that cannot be repaid and will not be repaid. Harney and Moten call
this place of bad debt the “fugitive public.” But rather than think of it as ultimately fugitive, I
like rather their emphasis that we need another sense “of what is owed that does not presume a
nexus of activities like recognition and acknowledgement, payment and gratitude.” “Credit,”
they argue, “is a means of privatization and debt a means of socialization.” As we know from
the study of non-capitalist societies, debt is a way to bind communities together; the debt should
never be fully or finally repaid.
I believe that progressives also need to get a lot better at building affective communities.
Religious communities are very good at that, but progressives have built their politics on the
assumption that rational thinking is all we need to bind ourselves to one another. If we examine
liberation theology, or more recently progressive versions of Islam as among the younger
9

generations in Malaysia, we can see they encompass critiques of capitalism’s devastations along
with the building of communities that are affectively tied to one another. In this way, we will be
better at refusing the definition of what is a “better life” that, as Swampa argues, appears
associated with the democratization of consumption, but in the frame of the dominant imperial
mode of life. Instead, we need new imaginations with respect to consumption and the
relationship with the environment, based on a different theory of social needs.
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